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The Renminbi Dilemma: 
To Float Or Not To Float 





The purpose of this research paper is to analyze the Renminbi (the Chinese currency) and suggest 
whether or not the currency should be allowed to float.  The paper makes use of four popular 
approaches to determine whether or not the currency is currently undervalued and if so, what 
mechanisms should be used to allow for its proper valuation.  According to the purchasing power 
parity, balance of payments approach, and the asset management approach, the Chinese currency 
is undervalued and will therefore appreciate in the future. We believe that although floating of the 
currency is advisable for the long run, it will not be in the best interest of the Chinese economy in 
the short run given the state of its banking system in particular.  Adopting a pure float will 
probably cause major macro and micro economic imbalances that will be difficult to tackle. 
Instead, we suggest a pegging of the Renminbi against a basket of currencies to ensure flexibility 
and stability in the system. 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
hina had been a leading civilization, towering above the world in both arts and sciences. But in the 
19th and early 20th centuries, the country was plagued by civil unrest, famines and wars. After World 
War II, the Communists under Mao Zedong, while ensuring China’s sovereignty, imposed strict 
controls over day-to-day life. In 1978, his successor Deng Xiaoping gradually introduced market-oriented reforms 
and decentralized the economic decision-making. As a result, output quadrupled by 2000. While political controls 
remain tight, economic controls continue to be re1axed. 
 
 
Figure 1 Chinese GDP since 1970 
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 In late 1978, the Chinese economy began to move away from a centrally planned to a more market-oriented 
economy. By 2003, China became the second-largest economy in the world after the US (based on purchasing 
power parity) with its 1.3 billion person population and a GDP of $5,000 per capita. Figure 1 shows the continuous 
rise in the GDP. The economy has recorded large gains due an increase in foreign investments and exports. 
However, the Chinese economy showed weaknesses such as increased bureaucracy, corruption, and growing income 
disparities. As a result, the economy has periodically backtracked. It is widely expected that the entrance of China to 
the World Trade Organization, while strengthening its ability to maintain strong growth rates, may at the same time 
put additional pressure on the mixed system of strong political controls and growing market openness. In that regard, 
China has stated its willingness to intensify efforts to stimulate growth not only through foreign investments and 
exports but also by an increase in spending on infrastructure and social programs. 
 
 
2.  THE CURRENCY AND THE CURRENCY REGIMES 
 
 The Renminbi (RMB) is China's legal currency. Renminbi in English means 'the People's Currency'. The 
basic unit of the currency is Yuan (l Yuan = 10 Jiao; l Jiao = 10 fen). China's central bank is authorized to issue and 
administer the national currency. 
 
 















































 The RMB has been a fairly stable currency in the international markets for the past few decades. This stable 
performance has mainly been the result of China's restrictive policy on the currency's convertibility. 
 
 China's foreign exchange regime underwent a major reform in 1994, in tandem with the deepening of its 
overall economic reform. China adopted the managed float exchange rate system. The exchange rate was set at 8.7 
Yuan/US$, at the beginning of 1994. In April 1994, China's foreign exchange center, located in Shanghai, became 
operational. It marked the beginning of China's inter-bank foreign exchange market. The value of the RMB 
appreciated slightly by reaching 8.3 Yuan/US$ by mid 1995 and has been stable at 8.28 Yuan/US$ from September 
1998 till present (January 28, 2004). Although China has officially adopted the managed float system, it actually 
follows a strict pegging system, where the currency is closely linked to the US dollar. 
 
3.  OVERVALUED OR UNDERVALUED 
 
 China continues to peg the Renminbi against the US dollar. However, there is a growing consensus, 
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 This paper attempts to determine, whether or not the RBM is undervalued. To that effect, we rely on four 
models of four exchange rate determinations: Purchasing Power Parity, Interest Rate Parity, Balance of Payments 
approach and the Asset Market approach. 
 
3.1  PURCHASING POWER PARITY (PPP) 
 
 Purchasing power parity (PPP) is a theory of exchange rate determination that compares the average costs 
of goods and services between countries. PPP theory is based on an extension and variation of the "law of one 
price".  
 
 As per the Law of one price, the prices of identical goods and services sold in two different markets should 
be the same, assuming there are no sale or transportation costs of moving the product between markets.  
 
 Therefore, by comparing the price of a similar commodity sold in two different countries, we can derive the 
implied PPP exchange rate. Finally, by comparing the implied PPP exchanger rate with the actual exchange rate, we 
can determine whether or not a particular currency is overvalued or undervalued. 
 
 
Table 1: Yuan compared to leading currencies  
based on the Big Mac Index as on January 15, 2004 - Implied PPP for Yuan. 
 
Country 
Big Mac Prices 








Overvalued or  
Undervalued 
Yuan 
China CNY 9.95 - - - 
US $2.65 3.75 8.3 CNY/$ -221.3% 
UK £1.99 5 14.66 CNY/£ -293.2% 
Euro €2.75 3.62 10.52CNY/€ -290.6% 
 
 
 Table 1, shows the implied PPP for the Yuan against leading currencies. The last column, in the table, 
shows the Renminbi as highly undervalued against all the three currencies. 
 
 Implied PPP was calculated by dividing the Big Mac prices in China by the Big Mac prices in the 
currencies under study. Empirical tests lend some support for PPP. The theory can provide a fair idea about the 
value of a currency. However, the approach performs better when used for a longer time period. In the short run a 
number of factors may cause the exchange to deviate from what the theory suggests. 
 
 Note: The Big Mac prices were available as of January 15, 2004. Hence the exchange rates and the 
resulting undervaluation and overvaluation figures are also as on January 15, 2004. 
 
3.2  INTEREST RATE PARITY (LRP) 
 
 This theory states that the difference in the national interest rates for securities of similar risks and maturity 
should be equal to, but opposite in sign to, the forward rate discount or premium for the foreign currency, except for 
transaction costs. 
 
 Using this theory, the interest rates prevailing in two different countries can be used to determine an 
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3 month Chinese Treasury bond yield = 0.95 (See Appendix A) 
3 month US treasury bond yield = 0.82 (See Appendix B) 
Current RMB spot rate = Yuan 8.28/USD. 
Yuan 8.28/USD * 0.95   
    0.82 
 
= Yuan 9.59/ USD 
 
 The estimated future exchange rate for the Yuan indicates a depreciation of the Yuan against the US dollar. 
However, it is important to note that short-term deviations may distort the result shown by the IRP. Also, a foreign 
exchange risk premium may affect the reliability of the theory. Further, the theory assumes that securities with 
similar risks should be used; however, finding such securities is often impossible. 
 
3.3  BALANCE OF PAYMENTS APPROACH 
 
 Depending upon the currency regime adopted by the country, the balance of payments can have a profound 
effect on the national currency's foreign exchange rate. Chinese authorities claim that they operate in a managed 
float system for. However, during the past three years, it has behaved like a rate pegged to the dollar.   Since 1996, 
the Renminbi (RMB) has traded consistently around RMB 8.3 per dollar 1.  Given the context, let’s see if the 
balance of payments can convey significant information about the true value of the Renminbi. 
 
 
Figure 3 Current Account Balances for China since 1992 












 China has shown consistent surplus in the current account balance since 1994, although the percentage of 
current account surplus to the GDP has been decreasing. Within the current account, much of the surplus emanates 
from the export of goods. China has a comparative advantage over other countries in labor-intensive products like 
low-cost clothing, textiles, footwear, toys, consumer electronics, sporting goods and equipment, furniture, and 
plastics. Through availability of cheap labor and infrastructure, these goods can be manufactured at a much cheaper 
price than elsewhere in the world and as such provide impetus for exports from China. 
 
 However, China has shown a persistent deficit in trade in services (a trend likely to expand with WTO 
membership). The Chinese service sector has been highly restricted and also highly underdeveloped. Areas such as 
banking, insurance, wholesale and retailing, consulting, healthcare, tourism, education, and scientific and 
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Figure 4: Financial Account Balance for China since 1992 

















 On the other hand, the international investment in China has increased substantially due first to large capital 
inflows in the previously restricted service sector and second, to a fairly stable investment environment in an 
otherwise volatile global business climate. China's attractiveness to overseas investors has generated surpluses in the 
financial account balances. Net inflows of direct investment have fluctuated between US$35 and US$45 billion per 
year since 1995. Prior to 1997 Asian financial crisis, net portfolio investment also showed surpluses, but that trend 
has largely reversed in recent years due to reduced investor confidence on equity investments. Overall, the financial 
account has shown a large surplus since 2002 and the surplus is expected to grow in the future.  
 
 
Figure 5 China's Balance of Payments since 1992 

















 To conclude, following the devaluation of the Yuan in 1993, China's trade balance has expanded rapidly 
and it has continued to attract substantial inflows of foreign investment, as the rest of the world sees the huge 
potential for growth in this very large, fast-growing market. With increasing foreign exchange reserves and constant 
surpluses in its balance of payments, an appreciation of the Renminbi is increasingly expected and hoped for by 
China’s major trade partners. 
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3.4  ASSET MARKET APPROACH 
 
 The asset market approach assumes that foreigners’ willingness to invest in a country is dependent on 
certain investment considerations or drivers.
 
An analysis of these drivers might help capture future trends and 
possibly reveal the future direction of the country's foreign exchange rate. 
 
Real Interest Rates: China had experienced a negative inflation (deflation) for 15 months before moving back into 
the positive inflation territory in the beginning of 2003. The deflation caused the real interest rates to be high. 
However, with inflation setting in, real interest rates started to decline. The real interest rate at the beginning of 2003 
was a mere 0.4 percent (one year depository rate of 1.40 percent and inflation of 1 percent)   against a high of 2.55 
percent (a high even as per international standards). Furthermore, if inflation rates increase as expected, the real 
interest rates will decrease rapidly. This lower rate would encourage investment and consumption, strengthening 
domestic demand and spurring economic growth. 
 
Future Growth Potential and Economic and Political Stability: The Chinese economy has experienced among 
the highest growth in GDP worldwide. It is also expected to continue to grow at a record 8.5 percent fueled again by 
exports, foreign investments, domestic demand, as well as by the effect of the reduction in import tariffs.  In fact, 







 The Chinese government has taken efforts to promote economic reforms with the adoption of a number of 
laws and regulations aimed at promoting foreign investment and trade as well as liberalizing the economy. In the 
year 2000, China implemented revisions of various laws dealing with product quality, environment protection, 
regional autonomy of minorities, and laws on foreign investment and trade. It also drafted laws on copyrights, 
trademarks, and reforms on state-owned enterprises. Moreover, laws to counter corruption were successfully 
implemented. 
 
 Nevertheless, potential problems do exist such as the large increases in the volume of domestic bank 
lending and potential for increased inflation. As of November 2003, the outstanding volume of total loans was up 
21.4 percent, nearly double the average increase of 11.9 percent over the period from 1997 to 2002. Most of the 
loans were directed towards the vast sector of Chinese State-owned enterprises (SOE), by far among the weakest in 
Chinese economy. 
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Table 2: China's Foreign Trade, Investment, and Exchange Reserve, 1983-1996 
(Billions of US$) 








as % of  
China's 
GDP 
1983 22.23 21.39 0.64 8.901 7.59 
1984 26.14 27.41 1.26 8.220 8.48 
1985 27.35 42.25 1.66 2.664 8.96 
1986 30.94 42.90 1.88 2.072 10.47 
1987 39.44 43.22 2.31 2.923 12.31 
1988 47.52 55.28 3.19 3.372 11.85 
1989 52.54 59.14 3.39 5.550 11.70 
1990 62.09 53.35 3.49 11.093 16.03 
1991 71.84 63.79 4.37 21.712 17.69 
1992 84.94 80.59 11.01 19.443 17.59 
1993 91.74 103.96 27.52 21.109 15.32 
1994 121.04 115.69 33.77 51.620 23.18 
1995 148.77 132.08 37.52 73.596 21.52 
1996 151.17 138.95 42.35 105.029 18.53 
2003 390.34 370.58 311.72 182.208 6.52 
Source: The Cato Institute http://www.cato.org/events/china/papers/wong.html  




 Also, following 15 months of deflation, China once again experienced inflation at the beginning of 2003. A 
November 2003 inflation report projects a 3.0 percent annual increase, the sharpest rise in nearly seven years. The 
Chinese government has taken some contractionary steps such as increasing the reserve requirements for banks. 
Although these steps have slowed the credit growth, the amount of outstanding credit is still large and as such stands 
to affect the country's banking industry.  
 
 In addition, the country faces certain environmental and healthcare issues; the breakout of SARS in 2003 is 
an obvious example for this. 
 
 To conclude, the inclusion of China in the WTO and opening of its various sectors to the outside world 
means that China will continue to attract foreign investments. Also expected is the continued growth in both imports 
and exports. The Chinese government has also shown its willingness to support a strong economy. The performance 
of the Chinese currency during the Asian crisis of 1997 asserts that the Renminbi is expected to remain strong.  
 
4.  RECOMMENDATION: FLOAT OR NOT TO FLOAT 
 
 The results of the above three approaches, continuous surpluses on the current and capital accounts in its 
balance of payments and the accumulation of large international reserves in large amounts, clearly indicate the 
presence of significant undervaluation of the Chinese currency the Renminbi. (Note: the above approaches offer 
limited support to measure the extent of the undervaluation, however the popular estimate is that the Renminbi is 
undervalued by as much as 20 to 30 percent. There is however limited justification for this figure.) 
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Table 3. Average Costs of Generating Foreign Exchange  
Earnings and the Official Exchange Rates: 1979-1996 
Year Average Costs of 
Generating Foreign 
Exchange Earnings 
(Yuan per U.S. Dollar) 
Official Exchange Rate  
(Yuan per U.S. Dollar) 
1979 2.40 1.56 
1980 2.31 1.50 
1981 2.48 2.80 
1982 2.67 2.80 
1983 3.03 2.80 
1984 2.79 2.80 
1985 3.20 2.94 
1986 3.50 3.45 
1987 4.20 3.72 
1988 4.15 3.72 
1989 5.06 3.77 
1990 5.87 4.78 
1991 5.50 5.32 
1992 5.58 5.51 
1993 - 5.81 
1994 - 8.61 
1995 8.40 8.35 
1996 - 8.31 
2004 - 8.28 
Source: The Cato Institute http://www.cato.org/events/china/papers/wong.html  
 
 
 The current exchange rate has proved helpful to the development of China. Rapid capital inflows and 
increasing demand for exports have helped strengthen the Chinese economy. However, the capital inflows and 
reserve accumulation have also led to excessive expansion in bank lending, money supply growth, and investment. 
In the first half of 2003, the increase in bank loans outstanding relative to GDP rose to an all time high of 38 percent, 
while the investment share of GDP rose to an all time high of 42 percent. If this trend continues, it will seriously 
affect the already weak Chinese banking industry. Inflationary trends are also visible and possibly threatening. 
 
 Within that context, while the pegging of the Renminbi helped China boost its economic performance, the 
US and Europe were plagued by large deficits in their trade and financial accounts with China fueled by an 
undervalued Renmimbi.  For example in 2003, the US recorded a $550 billion deficit in the current account balance. 
In that regard, a rise in the value of the RMB would provide an important catalyst for achieving both a broader-
based decline in the dollar and a better global "sharing" of the adjustment burden. 
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Source: International Monetary Fund 









 Therefore, the revaluation of the Renminbi and the adoption of a floating exchange rate regime would be an 
appropriate and logical development for the future, although it may not be in the best interest of the China’s 
domestic economy. Given China’s weak banking system (state banks are sill carrying mountains of bad loans) and 
archaic internal financial system, opening up the capital account might attract speculation and add more fragility to 
the system. It is imperative for China to have a political and economic system with more transparency, less 
corruption, and some notion of sound lending practices before choosing to float its currency.  
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  Source: Skorburg, J., (2003). China: Follow the Money. American Farm Bureau Federation 
  http://www.ifbf.org/commodity/pdf/20030905_chinafollowmoney.pdf  
 
 
 The most appropriate approach for China would be to peg the Renminbi against a basket of currencies 
instead of allowing it to float freely.  The basket would consist of China’s major trading partners.  As of 2003, the 
four main trade partners were the United States, Japan, Hong Kong, and the European Union as well as the six junior 
trade partners: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Republic of Korea, and Taiwan.  The trade volume with 
these 10 partners accounted for over 89 percent of the total.  Pegging against a basket of these currencies would 
remove the incentive for further speculative capital inflows and reserve accumulation.  A ten-currency basket would 
increase the stability of China’s overall trade-weighted exchange rate and moreover allow the US dollar to 
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